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Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law:
Does the Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great
Tower?
William R. Corbett*

“I will say in 25 years of advocacy before this Court I have not seen one
area of the law that seems to me as difficult to sort out as this particular
one is.”1
3

They said to each other, "Come, let's make bricks and bake them
thoroughly." They used brick instead of stone, and tar for mortar. 4 Then
they said, "Come, let us build ourselves a city, with a tower that reaches to
the heavens, so that we may make a name for ourselves and not be
scattered over the face of the whole earth."
5
But the Lord came down to see the city and the tower that the men were
building. 6 The Lord said, "If as one people speaking the same language
they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible
for them. 7 Come, let us go down and confuse their language so they will
not understand each other."
8
So the Lord scattered them from there over all the earth, and they
stopped building the city. 9 That is why it was called Babel —because
there the Lord confused the language of the whole world. From there the
Lord scattered them over the face of the whole earth.2
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1
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (No.08-441),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-441.pdf (statement
by Carter G. Phillips, arguing for respondent); see also Martha Chamallas, Title VII=s Midlife Crisis: The
Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 307-08 (2004) (stating that the statutes do not
define Adiscrimination,@ that ATitle VII law has never been easy,@ and that A[a]fter more than a decade of
litigation under the revised [1991] Act, . . . Title VII law has never been more complex and confusing@).
2
Genesis 11:3-9. There are numerous versions of the great tower story, including several in JudaeaChristian sources, the Quran and Islamic traditions, and Sumerian lore.
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INTRODUCTION
A. Building a Great Tower
About forty-five years ago, Congress drew up the blueprint and laid the
foundation of federal employment discrimination law with the enactment of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Since that time the Supreme Court has taken the lead in
developing the law by constructing legal theories and proof structures or analytical
frameworks to effectuate the prohibition in Title VII (and the other statutes) against
refusing to hire, firing, or otherwise discriminating in employment “because of . . . [the
protected characteristic].”4 The theories and proof structures inform employers, lawyers,

3

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. '' 2000e to 2000e-15). Title
VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 1965. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat.
241, 266 (1964) (stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date of enactment).
4
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Americans with Disabilities Act).
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and judges how courts at various stages of litigation will analyze employment decisions
to determine if they were made “because of” the protected characteristic. Congress from
time to time has revised the blueprint, sometimes adding new structures,5 and sometimes
tearing down work that the Supreme Court directed.6
So, think of employment discrimination law as a construction project—the
building of a great tower. Congress is the Architect, the Supreme Court is the Master
Builder, and the lower courts are the subordinate builders. From the beginning, it was an
astoundingly ambitious project—one that many would describe as audacious. Congress
envisioned a tower of law that would elevate people, reaching toward the heavens by
attempting to eradicate invidious employment discrimination.
With the blueprint drawn and the foundation laid by the Architect, the Master
Builder began building the theories and frameworks on the foundation in one of its first
employment discrimination decisions, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.7 The project of
building has continued apace since Griggs. The Court has built two major theories of
discrimination, disparate treatment8 and disparate impact,9 with proof structures10 under
5

Congress has passed new laws covering additional characteristics: the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§621-633a);
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117); and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
6
For example, Congress reacted to overturn Supreme Court decisions in the following statutes: the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)); the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 12101); and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (Jan. 29,
2009).
7
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8
Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
9
Disparate impact is a theory of unintentional discrimination in which liability is based on use of a facially
neutral practice or criterion that produces a statistically significant impact on a protected group, and the
practice cannot be justified. See, e.g., id.
10
“Proof structure” refers to what must be proven, in what order, and on whom the burden rests at each
stage. The Supreme Court in the decision in which it announced the McDonnell Douglas or pretext proof
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each. In Griggs the Court built a proof structure for disparate impact. In McDonnell
Douglas v. Green11 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins12 it built two for disparate
treatment: pretext and mixed motives, respectively. Along the way, the Master Builder
has remodeled some of its construction, as it did with the disparate impact proof structure
in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.13 The Architect occasionally has stepped back in
and done some renovation when it did not like the Master Builder’s construction,14 but it
has left most of the details of construction to the Master Builder. Courts, lawyers, and
others have spoken essentially a single language of employment discrimination law as
they have applied most of the same theories, frameworks, and principles to all of the
laws.15 The minor variations in the law applicable to the different employment
discrimination statutes might be likened to different dialects.16 The common language
has facilitated the building project.17 With a common language, the builders built a tower

structure described the thing it was creating: “The case before us raises significant questions as to the
proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973).
11
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
12
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
13
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
14
See supra note 6.
15
See, e.g., David J. Willbrand, Comment, Better Late Than Never? The Function of After-Acquired
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 693 (1996) (“This occurrence
should not be surprising, for courts, in a sort of jurisprudential cross-pollination, have traditionally
borrowed and applied employment discrimination principles across statutory bounds.”); see also Rhonda
M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 846 (2004) (warning that “[a]nti-discrimination principles
are often mechanistically applied without sufficient exploration of difference”).
16
Some variations are required by the blueprints drawn by Congress, and others have been fashioned by the
Court as it has built. For example, statutory differences include the following: 1) the bona fide
occupational qualification applies to sex, religion, and national origin under Title VII, and age under the
ADEA, but not to race and color. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (Title VII BFOQ) and 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)
(ADEA BFOQ); 2) Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 added a statutory disparate impact analysis,
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k), and a statutory mixed-motives analysis to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) &
2000e-5(g)(2)(B), but not to the ADEA; 3) the ADEA’s defense of “reasonable factors other than age,” has
no counterpart in Title VII. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(1); and 4) the duty to make a reasonable accommodation
applies to only religion under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), and disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A).
17
For example, the courts have developed facility with the pretext and mixed-motives structures because
they have applied them across the employment discrimination statutes. Indeed, they have applied them to
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that was largely symmetrical regardless of which part of it one viewed--Title VII, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), or the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA).18 Despite minor variations, symmetry seemed to be a salient characteristic of the
blueprint. In 1991 the Architect expressed displeasure with some of the recent work on
the tower by issuing modifications to the original blueprint; with the Civil Rights Act of
1991 (or “the 1991 Act”),19 Congress demolished some of the structure and issued
modifications of the original blueprint. It is the Architect’s 1991 plan and its subsequent
interpretation by the Master Builder that has brought us to the current state of confusion.
In 2003, the Court began its work of interpreting the 1991 modifications of the
blueprint by adding a strange-looking structure to the building--Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa.20 It was a structure that deviated substantially from the work that had gone before
it, but the Court said it was required by the new blueprint. The new structure, in addition
to being different from what had gone before it, did not have sharp lines. It was hard for
the subordinate builders (lower courts) to understand Desert Palace and to know how to
build on it. In 2009 the Supreme Court added another structure, this time to the ADEA
side of the tower, based on its interpretation of the 1991 drawings and a surprising new
interpretation of the original blueprint--Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc.21

other types of employment claims. See, e.g., Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 332-33
(5th Cir.2005) (applying Desert Palace mixed-motives analysis to FMLA retaliation claim). Moreover,
there is a large and rich body of case law on which courts can rely, which is larger because of the crosspollination.
18
This Article focuses on the law under Title VII and the ADEA. Many of the principles developed under
Title VII, including the proof structures, also have been applied to the ADA. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (applying the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to an ADA case).
19
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The 1991 Act was enacted after President Bush’s veto of
the similar Civil Rights Act of 1990. 136 Cong. Rec. S16,418-19 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990). A principal
objective of the 1991 Act was to overturn several Supreme Court decisions. See H.R. Rep. No. 40, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96.
20
539 U.S. 90 (2003).
21
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
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When viewed alongside Desert Palace, Gross reveals several things about the
current and future work on the tower. First, the Master Builder believes that the plans
handed down by the Architect in 1991 require structures different from what the
subordinate builders had constructed before.22 More surprisingly, the 1991 plan has
prompted the Master Builder to reinterpret the original blueprint and demolish exiting
structures, telling the builders that they misunderstood the original blueprint.23 Second,
the Master Builder now reads the blueprint, by interpreting the new 1991 drawings and
reinterpreting the original blueprint, as requiring a shift to asymmetrical building—use of
different structures, depending upon the part of the tower. Now the Supreme Court is
requiring courts and lawyers to speak slightly different languages depending on the part
of the tower on which they are working—Title VII or the ADEA. This change in plans
would be confounding enough, but the subordinate builders are further confused by the
Master Builder’s refusal to give detailed instructions about its new interpretation of the
blueprint. The Court in Desert Palace made general statements about the construction to
be done, but declined to give detailed instructions. The Court was more concrete in its
pronouncement in Gross, but still not clear enough. Third, not only is the Court requiring
different structures for the ADEA and Title VII, Gross is the latest in a series of cases
instructing that the ADEA portion of the tower is to be much less prominent than the
Title VII part.
At this point, as the subordinate builders try to build on Desert Palace and Gross,
their language has been differentiated, and they are confounded about what and how to

22

In both Desert Palace and Gross, the Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as changing the case
law under Title VII and the ADEA, respectively.
23
In Gross the Court looked to the language of the ADEA and said that the meaning of “because of . . .
age” has been misinterpreted by the lower courts. See infra Part I.B.
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build on the recent structures. Furthermore, it is not clear that the asymmetry resulting
from the perceived new blueprint will yield a sound structure. The Master Builder’s
interpretation of the new blueprint will produce a scaled-down version on the ADEA
portion of the tower. While the builders obviously will do their best to build on the
structures created by the Master Builder, it is fair to ask whether this is the tower that the
Architect intended. Most of the uncertainty and confusion stem from the blueprint
modifications of 1991. Maybe the Architect intended only minor changes in the building
rather than a significant reinterpretation of the blueprint. It is highly questionable
whether the Master Builder is correctly interpreting the 1991 plan and the original
blueprint as modified.
B. Interpreting the Blueprint
What characteristics did Congress intend for the great tower of employment
discrimination law? Perhaps it should be simple to the extent that such a project can be
simple with sharp, well-defined lines so that employees and employers can understand
their rights and obligations and lawyers and judges can apply it accurately and
expeditiously, although some measure of complexity24 and uncertainty25 is necessary

24

Simplicity can be a good characteristic of laws, but in some cases simplicity may be achieved at the
expense of fairness, effectiveness, or other characteristics that also are desirable. Compare RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) (favoring simple legal rules if rules cannot be
avoided) with Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
150, 161 (1995):
Complexity often is discussed as an evil to be minimized, as in commentary on the
income tax. Of course, less complexity is to be preferred if the same substantive rules can
be applied. But much complexity--the type examined in this article--arises because of the
benefits from rules that are more precisely tailored to particular behavior. To talk of
minimizing complexity in this context is misguided: the simplest rules might permit all
acts, require equal reductions of all pollutants regardless of their toxicity, or require the
same speed limit on all roads.
25

Certainty would be considered by most to be a positive characteristic of law, so that parties can know the
law and manage their conduct accordingly. Moreover, certainty facilitates the assessment of claims by
employers and employees, lawyers, and judges. Generally, it is believed that uncertainty raises the costs
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and may even be beneficial. A high degree of symmetry among the various laws and
covered characteristics also may be desirable, as this may improve simplicity and
certainty, although complete uniformity is not appropriate because discrimination based
on the various protected characteristics is not a monolithic phenomenon,26 and the goals
of and rationales for the laws differ somewhat.27 If simplicity, certainty, and symmetry
are characteristics generally intended by Congress, recent Supreme Court interpretations
of the laws reveal a structure that is becoming more complex, less certain on some crucial
questions, and less symmetrical across the laws. The Court says this is the structure as
drawn by Congress in the original blueprint and the 1991 modification.
With a national demographic of a large and increasing percentage of older
people28 and a large percentage of the workforce composed of older workers,29 the
ADEA has become an increasingly significant law. One measure of its increasing

and decreases the efficiency of the law. See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really),
59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 652 (2008). There are circumstances, however, in which uncertainty may achieve
socially beneficial results. For example, uncertainty may cause actors to avoid brinksmanship regarding
violating the law and instead become proactive in developing strategies to avoid liability. Cf. Frank
Dobbin, Do the Social Sciences Shape Corporate Anti-Discrimination Practice? The United States and
France, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 829, 833 (2002):
[E]mployers were uncertain of what the law meant and of where it was going. To
inoculate themselves against employment discrimination suits, which could prove costly
and embarrassing, they engaged experts who followed social-scientific understandings of
discrimination and who institutionalized equal opportunity practices in anticipation of
where the courts would go.
26
See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 1993); see also Reaves, supra note 15
(explaining why it is inappropriate to import all Title VII race discrimination law into the ADEA).
27
See, .e.g., Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1813, 1813 (1996) (discussing different justification for the ADEA); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances:
The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2000) (positing that employment
discrimination law has sought to achieve a more far-reaching societal transformation regarding race than
sex).
28
See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE
UNITED STATES (Updated June 7, 2006), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68820.pdf.
29
See generally Bureau of Labor Statistics, Older Workers: Are There More Older People in the
Workplace, http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2008/older_workers/; Dennison Keller, Note, Older, Wiser and
More Dispensable: ADEA Options Available Under Smith v. City of Jackson: Desperate Times Call for
Disparate Impact, 33 NORTHERN KY. L. REV. 259, 279 (2006).
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significance is the increase in volume of claims filed and ensuing litigation.30 Several
recent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the ADEA as being a less prominent
part of the tower. It is not clear that this is consistent with Congress’s plan.
I have argued that the uncertainty and complexity introduced into employment
discrimination law by the Master Builder in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa31 six years ago
should have been vexing enough to the Architect to prompt Congress to work on the
blueprint.32 The Court’s recent decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc.33 has
made the need for intervention far more urgent. Gross interpreted the ADEA in light of
the 1991 Act as requiring a high degree of asymmetry between the ADEA and Title VII.
Gross also was the latest of several Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ADEA in a
way that substantially reduces the protections of the ADEA below those of Title VII.
Gross should make it abundantly clear that Congress must draft a clear blueprint
addressing the issues rather than simply tearing down particular Supreme Court
decisions. If the Builder is reading the plans incorrectly, it is incumbent on the Architect
to issue new plans which detail how the work is to proceed. Even if the Master Builder is
correctly interpreting the blueprint, it is not giving clear and detailed instructions to its
builders, and the Architect should provide clarity. In doing so, the Architect should learn

30

A good measure of the volume of disputes is the data generated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) on discrimination charges filed with the agency. See
http://eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html. For 2008, the EEOC reported a 28% increase in age charges filed over
the number filed in 2007, which was the largest increase among all types of charges. See
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html; EEOC Charges Reached Record High, Commission Confirms in
Fiscal 2008 Report, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at A-12 (Mar. 12, 2009). The agency’s 12-year chart
shows a general upward trend and a significant increase from 1997. See Reaves, supra note 15, at 843 &
n.7 (“[O]lder workers are the fastest growing group of discrimination plaintiffs.”).
31
539 U.S. 90 (2003).
32
William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81 (2009) [hereinafter
Corbett, Fixing].
33
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
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from the experience in 1991 and issue a detailed plan for the work that does not leave as
many matters for the Master Builder to interpret as it did in the 1991 Act.
Part I of this article examines the Court’s decisions in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. The section compares and contrasts those
decisions—the two Supreme Court cases interpreting the blueprint regarding disparate
treatment after the 1991 Act. The section explains how, taken together, Desert Palace
and Gross have made employment discrimination law more complex, less certain, and
less symmetrical. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.34 is
discussed as an interpretation that the Supreme Court could have adopted in Gross to
maintain uniformity of proof structures between Title VII and the ADEA. Part II
discusses Gross as the latest of several Court decisions constricting the ADEA. Part III
proposes that Congress, as Architect, should step in and clarify the blueprint in a way that
at least addresses the issue of the appropriate proof structures under Title VII and the
ADEA. If Congress wants more simplicity, certainty, and symmetry, it will need to make
several changes.
It is not clear from the various renditions of the old story whether the Tower of
Babel collapsed or the people, confounded by their different languages, gave up the
project and dispersed to pursue other endeavors. Regardless, the great tower of
employment discrimination law should have a better fate. I think that fate rests in the
hands of the Architect.
I. THE MASTER BUILDER REINTERPRETS THE BLUEPRINT
A. The First Interpretation of the 1991 Blueprint Modifications: Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa
34

376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
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In Desert Palace,35 the plaintiff sued her employer claiming that she was treated
differently than male employees and eventually was terminated in a case of disparate
discipline because of her sex. The plaintiff won a jury verdict in the trial court. On
appeal, the defendant employer argued that the district court erroneously gave a mixedmotives jury instruction. The defendant argued that the jury instruction was unsupported
because the plaintiff did not present direct evidence of discrimination. The Ninth Circuit
in an en banc decision rejected the prerequisite of direct evidence to invoke the mixedmotives analysis.36 The direct evidence requirement was based on Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,37 and the court, looking to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 did not find any such requirement in the codified version of the
mixed-motives analysis. The Ninth Circuit went on to explain the continuing viability of
the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework as a tool to analyze claims on motions for
summary judgment but declared it to be irrelevant to jury instructions.38 In a very short
opinion, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, relying upon the Civil Rights Act of
1991 as abrogating the direct evidence requirement emanating from Price Waterhouse.39
The Court held that A[i]n order to obtain an instruction under '2000e-2(m), a plaintiff
need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that >race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
35

I cover Desert Palace briefly and Gross more fully because Desert Palace has been discussed and
critiqued extensively. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102-03 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est
Mort; Vie le Roi!” An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell-Douglas and the Transformation of Every
Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 72
(2003); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell
Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1892-1909 (2004); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the
Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549 (2005) [hereinafter Corbett, Allegory]; William R. Corbett,
McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace? 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199 (2003).
36
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
37
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
38
Costa, 299 F.3d at 854.
39
539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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motivating factor for any employment practice.=@40 About the continuing viability of the
pretext analysis, the Court indirectly said it would not resolve that issue: AThis case does
not require us to decide when, if ever, ' 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive
context.@41
With Desert Palace, the Court interpreted the new blueprint as eradicating the
line, derived from Price Waterhouse (Justice O’Connor’s concurrence), that determined
whether cases were analyzed under the pretext or mixed-motives proof structure. The
Court declined to say, however, whether the McDonnell Douglas proof structure
remained viable, and if so, what was the new dividing line.
B. More Than Desert Palace II: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
The plaintiff had worked for the defendant employer for thirty-two years. In
2003, when plaintiff was 54 years old, he was working as claims administration director,
until he was reassigned to the position of claims project coordinator. Although he
retained the same compensation, many of his former position’s job responsibilities were
shifted to a newly created job of position-claims administration manager. A woman in
her early forties whom plaintiff previously had supervised was given the new position.
The plaintiff considered his job reassignment to be a demotion, and he sued for age
discrimination.
The case was tried in federal district court. At the close of trial, the court gave
jury instructions to which the defendant objected:
Gross had the burden to prove that (1) FBL demoted Gross to Claims
Project Coordinator on January 1, 2003, and (2) that Gross's age was “a
40

Id. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
Id. at 94 n.1. Although the Court said nothing about pretext, it said it would not resolve the range of
cases covered by mixed motives. The point is that there may be no cases left to which the pretext
framework applies.
41

12

motivating factor” in FBL's decision to demote Gross. Final Jury
Instruction No. 11. The instruction continued that the jury's verdict must
be for FBL, however, “if it has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant would have demoted plaintiff regardless of his
age.”42

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded $46,945.
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the employer challenged the jury instructions,
arguing that the trial court erred in giving a mixed-motives jury instruction based on
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, because it was undisputed that direct evidence of age
discrimination was not presented. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in
giving the mixed-motives jury instructions because under Price Waterhouse direct
evidence is required for such a jury instruction. The plaintiff conceded that he did not
present direct evidence. The court rejected the argument that the jury instruction was
correct because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert
Palace superseded Price Waterhouse. The court explained that although the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 amended Title VII to provide a statutory version of the mixed-motives
analysis,43 Congress did not similarly amend the ADEA. The court explained that the
Supreme Court in Desert Palace interpreted the language of section 2000e-2(m), added
to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as making Price Waterhouse inapplicable to
Title VII cases because the section does not refer to a prerequisite of direct evidence for
“motivating factor” to be the applicable causation standard. Thus, the Eighth Circuit held
that Price Waterhouse remains controlling for ADEA cases. Therefore, in the absence of
direct evidence, the trial court incorrectly gave a jury instruction that shifted the burden
of persuasion to the defendant.
42
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following question: Must a plaintiff
present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in
a non-Title VII discrimination case?44 The Court majority, in a 5-4 decision,
acknowledged the foregoing question as the one on which certiorari was granted, but then
stated that it first must decide whether the burden of persuasion ever shifts to the
defendant in an ADEA case.45 The majority rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on decisions
interpreting Title VII as controlling. The Court explained that it never had held that the
mixed-motives analysis of Price Waterhouse applies to the ADEA.46 When it enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended Title VII to add the mixed-motives analysis,
but it did not similarly amend the ADEA.47 Thus, with the 1991 Act, Congress created a
“materially different” burden of persuasion in Title VII than exists in the ADEA:
“motivating factor” in Title VII and “because of” in the ADEA.48 The Court thus
concluded that its interpretation of the ADEA is not controlled by decisions interpreting
Title VII—specifically Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace. Although it was not
unexpected for the Court to hold that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 rendered Desert
Palace inapplicable to ADEA claims (as this was the focal issue in the many briefs), it
was surprising that it held Price Waterhouse inapposite. Lower courts uniformly had
assumed the applicability of the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis to ADEA
claims,49 and there was nothing in the 1991 Act that seemed to upset that state of the law.
The Court rationalized the inapplicability of Price Waterhouse on the basis of the
44
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following: 1) in the 1991 Act Congress amended Title VII, adding a statutory mixed
motives analysis, but it did not similarly amend the ADEA; and 2) the Court itself never
had extended the Price Waterhouse analysis to the ADEA, notwithstanding the unanimity
of lower courts in so applying it.
Having dispatched with the authority of Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace, the
Court majority shifted to interpreting the text of the ADEA. The Court read the “because
of . . . age” language to mean that age is the but-for cause of the employer’s action.50 The
Court explained this interpretation of “because of” based on dictionary definitions, Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins,51 a couple of non-employment-discrimination Court decisions
interpreting the similar language “by reason of” and “based on,” and a torts treatise
explaining but-for causation.52 From these sources, the Court gleaned that the “ordinary”
meaning of the statutory language “because of” is but-for causation. Having concluded
that the standard of causation is but-for, the Court turned to the burden of persuasion.
The Court stated that the default rule is that plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion, and
the text of the ADEA indicates no exception to that default rule.53 Locking in a uniform
analysis for intentional discrimination age cases, the Court stated that the burden of
persuasion is the same in mixed-motives cases as in other disparate treatment cases: the
plaintiff must prove that age is the but-for cause of the employer’s decision.54
Having decided the case, the Court added comments about its strict textual
approach and its distaste for the Price Waterhouse analysis. After reminding that it does
not consider Price Waterhouse controlling, the majority stated that “it is far from clear
50
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that the Court would have the same approach were it to consider the question today in the
same instance.”55 The Court proceeded to criticize the Price Waterhouse framework as
difficult to apply and stated that even if the analysis were doctrinally sound, “the
problems associated with its application have eliminated any perceivable benefit to
extending its framework to the ADEA.”56 The Court concluded by clearly stating its
holding: “a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the `but-for’ cause of the
challenged adverse employment action.”57
There were two dissents. The dissent authored by Justice Stevens had two major
points of contention with the majority—one procedural and one substantive. First, the
dissent criticized the majority for not following “prudential Court practices”58 by
answering a question on which certiorari was not granted and which was raised in the
respondent’s brief.59 Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of
“because of . . . age” as meaning but-for causation.
On substantive grounds, the dissent considered Price Waterhouse as controlling
on the issue of interpretation of the “because of language” as meaning “motivating
factor” or “substantial factor” rather than but-for causation.60 Although Price
Waterhouse interpreted the “because of” language under Title VII, the language under the
two statutes, before the 1991 Act, was identical. The Court long had applied
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interpretations of Title VII to the ADEA. The dissent disagreed with the majority that
Hazen Paper Co. and Sanderson Plumbing Products v. Reeves61 support a but-for
causation standard for the ADEA. Rather, the dissent read those cases as support for
ADEA standards generally conforming to Title VII standards. Whereas the majority
interpreted Congress’s not amending the ADEA to include a mixed-motives analysis
when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as rejecting mixed-motives under the
ADEA, the dissent interpreted this as a ratification of the continuing applicability of the
Price Waterhouse analysis to the ADEA.62 The dissent drew support from the Court’s
2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson.63 In Smith the Court held that because
Congress did not, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codify a disparate impact proof
structure in the ADEA as it did in Title VII, the existing Wards Cove [Packing Co. v.
Atonio]64 version continued to apply to the ADEA. Finally, the dissent countered the
majority’s point that the Price Waterhouse proof structure is too complicated and thus
more trouble than it is worth by pointing out that Congress codified a modified version of
it in Title VII.65 Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority’s concern for the
inscrutability of the mixed-motives analysis for trial courts and juries was belied by the
fact that the majority introduced more complexity into cases in which both Title VII and
ADEA claims are raised and must be analyzed differently.66
Turning to the question on which certiorari was granted, the dissent stated that it
would extend the holding of Desert Palace, a Title VII case, to hold that direct evidence
61
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is not required for a mixed-motives jury instruction.67 The dissent first explained that
neither the four-justice plurality in Price Waterhouse nor Justice White’s concurrence in
that decision required direct evidence for a mixed-motives analysis. Thus, the dissent
argued that courts that have treated Justice O’Connor’s concurrence as controlling have
been wrong.68 Regardless, the dissent found any questions raised by Price Waterhouse to
have been answered by Desert Palace. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not
amend the ADEA regarding the mixed-motives analysis, the dissent relied on Desert
Palace for a proposition it stated about Title VII that is equally true about the ADEA:
neither statute by its terms imposes a direct evidence requirement.69
A dissent authored by Justice Breyer focused on why a standard of causation
lower than but-for is appropriate for discrimination cases. The Breyer dissent described
the difficulty of discerning the motives for employers’ decisions. The dissent posited that
but-for causation is not as difficult in tort law which deals with objective facts as it is in
employment discrimination where the but-for standard is applied to subjective mental
states.70 Because the employer is in a better position than the employee to know its
motives, the dissent could discern nothing “unfair or impractical” in requiring a plaintiff
to prove that age played a role and then the employer can try to prevail on the affirmative
defense by proving that it would have made the same decision.71
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C. Desert Palace and Gross: The Master Builder Reinterprets the Blueprint and
Confounds the Builders
In 2003 the Supreme Court changed employment discrimination law as we knew
it. In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court held that direct evidence of discrimination is
not a prerequisite for a court to give a motivating-factor jury instruction in Title VII
cases.72 The holding itself changed the established case law about how to evaluate
disparate treatment cases under Title VII. The Court resolved the effect that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 has on existing employment discrimination doctrine developed in
Price Waterhouse and its progeny. Beyond the holding, the decision implicated a
number of other significant issues that it did not answer. Did the pretext analysis
developed for Title VII disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas v. Green73
remain viable? If the pretext analysis survives Desert Palace, what determines whether a
case is evaluated under the pretext analysis or the mixed-motives analysis? If the pretext
analysis survives, at what stages of litigation does it apply? The Court in a footnote
essentially stated that it was not resolving these other questions.74 The Court thus
decided the narrowest issue presented in Desert Palace, and in the aftermath, left
litigation of disparate treatment cases under Title VII in a state of disarray.75 In addition
to the questions Desert Palace left unresolved about Title VII, courts and commentators
were left to discern what, if any, effect Desert Palace had on the ADEA.
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Six years after Desert Palace was decided, the Court ventured back into the
chaotic area of the proof structures used to analyze intentional discrimination cases.
When the Court granted certiorari in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc,76 it appeared
to be Desert Palace Part II. As decided by the Court, however, it turned out to be much
more. Thus, the Court seemed poised to answer a narrow question: Whether the Price
Waterhouse direct evidence/circumstantial evidence line which divides cases between
pretext and mixed-motives analyses still applies to ADEA claims, even though it no
longer applies to Title VII. Different treatment of the two employment discrimination
laws was feasible because the Civil Rights Act of 1991, on which the Court focused its
analysis in Desert Palace, did not amend the ADEA as it did Title VII. Gross thus
appeared to be the sequel to Desert Palace, answering the same question for the ADEA
that Desert Palace answered for Title VII. Surprisingly, the Court rendered a decision
that answered a much broader question. The Court held that the mixed-motives analysis
or proof structure does not even apply to ADEA cases; instead, the burden of persuasion
is on the plaintiff to prove but-for causation, and the burden never shifts to the
defendant.77
The comparisons and contrasts between Desert Palace and Gross are numerous
and striking. The same issue was before the Court, under Title VII in Desert Palace and
under the ADEA in Gross. The Court in Desert Palace showed remarkable restraint in
answering a narrow question and not answering additional questions that were
implicated, the answers to which were needed to avoid rampant confusion in Title VII
disparate treatment litigation. In contrast, in Gross the Court went out of its way to
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answer a broad question, which probably will produce a high degree of certainty in
litigation of ADEA disparate treatment claims. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 played an
important role in each case, but it played a very different role in each. In Desert Palace
the Court announced a major change in the law by interpreting the Civil Rights Act of
1991 as requiring the change. In contrast, in Gross the Court announced what most
courts and commentators likely perceive as a major change in the law by using the Civil
Rights Act to free it of the potential precedential effect of Desert Palace and, even more
surprisingly, Price Waterhouse. Desert Palace could have moved the state of the law to
a single proof structure applicable to Title VII disparate treatment claims, but the Court
did not rule broadly enough to make that result clear, and few courts have interpreted
Desert Palace that way.78 Because Gross ruled broadly, for the ADEA there now is a
single analysis based on a single causation standard, but the Court did not resolve the
issue of what, if any, proof structures apply under the ADEA. Generally, Desert Palace
moved the law in a positive direction for plaintiffs under Title VII, while Gross moved it
in a positive direction for defendants under the ADEA. Before Desert Palace, the pretext
analysis created by McDonnell Douglas and the mixed-motives analysis created by Price
Waterhouse were the twin pillars of disparate treatment litigation. Desert Palace made
Price Waterhouse irrelevant to Title VII cases, but left uncertainty about McDonnell
Douglas. Gross finished off Price Waterhouse, declaring it irrelevant to the ADEA and
thus dead law, but it left us uncertain about McDonnell Douglas.
Considered together, Desert Palace and Gross redefine the proof structures or
analyses applicable to disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the ADEA.
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Because they address the proof structures applicable to the two oldest employment
discrimination laws that generate the overwhelming number of charges and lawsuits, the
two cases have significantly reshaped employment discrimination law, even if they have
left some of the contours ill defined. What does the new blueprint look like? After
Desert Palace there may be a single, uniform analysis under Title VII, but that is
uncertain. After Gross there is a single, uniform analysis under the ADEA, but it may
not use any proof structure applicable to Title VII. Title VII and the ADEA may share a
proof structure, if both still recognize the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, but they
may not. Regardless of how that matter is resolved, we know after Desert Palace and
Gross that the mixed-motives analysis is a not a uniform across Title VII and the ADEA
because the ADEA recognizes no mixed-motives proof structure. Thus, predictions of
potential uniformity in analysis of disparate treatment claims among the employment
discrimination statutes,79 for better or worse, have been frustrated.
D. The Interpretation the Master Builder Rejected: Rachid v. Jack in the Box
About a year after the Desert Palace decision was rendered and five years before
Gross, the Fifth Circuit confronted blueprint interpretation issues in Rachid v. Jack in the
Box.80 It is instructive to consider the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rachid because it
attempted to interpret what the Court said (and didn’t say) in Desert Palace, which is no
mean feat in its own right, and to anticipate what the Court would say in Gross. Rachid
involved an age discrimination claim. The district court had granted defendant’s motion
79
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for summary judgment. Plaintiff argued that the trial court had erroneously evaluated his
case under the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, but that it should have used the
mixed-motives analysis of Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace. The defendant argued
that the trial court correctly declined to apply the mixed-motives analysis because the
plaintiff did not introduce direct evidence. The Fifth Circuit began its analysis with
Desert Palace, saying that it had not yet addressed whether the decision changes the
Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas analyses.81 The Fifth Circuit rendered two
significant holdings: 1) Whatever changes Desert Palace wrought in the two proof
structures under Title VII, the same result should apply under the ADEA; and 2) Desert
Palace did alter the two proof structures, and the Fifth Circuit fashioned a new single
analysis merging the two. The first holding would be repudiated by the Supreme Court in
Gross.
The Rachid court’s first holding was broad. The court might have more narrowly
held that a mixed-motives analysis applied to the ADEA, but it was the Price Waterhouse
version because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not codify a new mixed-motives
analysis in the ADEA as it did in Title VII. Instead, the court reasoned that because the
core “because of . . .” sections in Title VII and the ADEA were virtually identical, the
statutes should be interpreted similarly. Just as Desert Palace pointed out that Title VII
provided for no heightened standard of direct evidence to invoke mixed motives, the Fifth
Circuit pointed out that the ADEA specified no such requirement. Thus, the court held
that direct evidence was not required for a mixed-motives analysis.
Next, the Court held that Desert Palace required a modification of the two proof
structures, and the court achieved that by merging the two proof structures into what it
81
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termed “the modified McDonnell Douglas analysis” in which the first two parts of the
pretext analysis remain unchanged, and only the third part is modified. At part three, a
plaintiff may prevail by proving either pretext or motivating factor.82 If the plaintiff
proves motivating factor, then the same-decision defense is available to the defendant.
It is instructive to compare and contrast Rachid and Gross. The Fifth Circuit in
Rachid was interpreting and attempting to build on Desert Palace. Both the Supreme
Court in Gross and the Fifth Circuit in Rachid said that they were interpreting the
statutory text of the ADEA, and yet they reached opposite results. Furthermore, the Fifth
Circuit in Rachid found it necessary to distinguish its decision in Smith v. City of
Jackson,83 and the Supreme Court in Gross distinguished its decision in Smith, which
overruled the Fifth Circuit’s decision.84 The Fifth Circuit obviously did not read the
blueprint as the Supreme Court does. Who did a better job of interpreting the blueprint:
the Master Builder or the subordinate builder? I think the Fifth Circuit came closer to
building what Congress intended, based on the characteristics that the tower needs. At
least, the Fifth Circuit came closer to building what Congress should draw in its next
modification of the blueprint.
E. Who, If Anyone, Is Reading the Blueprint Correctly?
Does the Master Builder know what the employment discrimination blueprint, as
amended in 1991, requires? Desert Palace and Gross provoke at least a modicum of
doubt.
There is not much to criticize about what the Supreme Court said in Desert
Palace. It was, after all, a unanimous decision. However, the Court has been
82
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appropriately criticized for what it did not say. Regarding what the Court said, was the
Court correct in interpreting the 1991 Act as abrogating the Price Waterhouse line
between pretext and mixed-motives cases? It is not an unreasonable interpretation, but
also not a necessary interpretation. It seems just as likely, and perhaps more likely, that
Congress in the Act specified only what it wanted to change about Price Waterhouse and
other targeted Supreme Court cases. That is, by saying nothing about the direct
evidence/circumstantial evidence dividing line in the 1991 Act, Congress did not intend
to effect any change.85 Even so, the direct/circumstantial dividing line was chimerical,
yielding a variety of approaches to distinguishing direct evidence from circumstantial
evidence,86 and it is likely that no one sheds a tear for the Court’s abolishing a bad
standard. However, the Court has been faulted for saying too little.87 Lower courts did
not know after Desert Palace whether there were two proof structures for analyzing
disparate treatment cases or one, and if two, how to distinguish which applied to which
cases.88
Enter the subordinate builder in Rachid to build on Desert Palace. The court first
guessed that Desert Palace also would govern the ADEA. One may fault the Fifth
Circuit for this prediction and its reasoning. After all, other courts had reached the
contrary result because Desert Palace based its holding on the 1991 Act’s amendment of
Title VII (and it did not similarly amend the ADEA).89 However, the Fifth Circuit
believed that a fundamental principle of the original blueprint, carried forward in the
85
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1991 revision, was symmetry, and it used that principle to resolve the issue. In Rachid,
the Fifth Circuit looked at the odd structure of Desert Palace and chose to build on it
something that was simple, clear, and symmetrical. It created a single proof structure
applicable to disparate treatment claims under both Title VII and the ADEA. Moving on,
the Fifth Circuit then tried to interpret what the Court’s Desert Palace decision meant
about the two proof structures. The court built a single merged proof structure consisting
of pretext and mixed motives. Although it is a curious looking structure and one that I
think is illogical,90 it was based on the preexisting structures and demonstrated symmetry
and clarity, if not simplicity.
The Master Builder returned in Gross to tear down part of the Rachid
construction, holding that mixed motives does not apply to the ADEA. The decision
merits criticism on several grounds. First, the Court obviously is correct that the 1991
Act did not amend the ADEA to create a codified version of mixed motives as it did Title
VII. Thus, the Court concluded that mixed motives does not apply under the ADEA. On
the contrary, the dissent argued that what follows from the 1991 Act is that the Price
Waterhouse version of mixed motives still applies to the ADEA. The majority’s answer
was that Price Waterhouse was a case involving a Title VII claim, and the Supreme Court
never had held the case’s mixed-motives analysis to be applicable to the ADEA, although
the courts of appeals had. The Court then said it must go back to the language of the
ADEA , and it interpreted the “because of . . . age” language as requiring but-for
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causation. There are several problems with this reasoning. First, the Court makes it a
point that, after the 1991 Act, the burden of persuasion in Title VII and that in the ADEA
are different. While that is true, the burden of persuasion was “because of” for both at
the time Price Waterhouse was decided, as the Stevens dissent in Gross and the Rachid
court pointed out. Second, the Court rejects the point of Justice Stevens in his dissent
that the Court’s approach in Smith v. City of Jackson should lead the Court in Gross to
revert to the Price Waterhouse analysis for ADEA claims. In Smith the Court concluded
that because Congress did not amend the ADEA with a statutory version of disparate
impact, the Wards Cove version would continue to apply to the ADEA.91 The majority
attempts to counter this argument by saying essentially that Price Waterhouse cannot be
applied to the ADEA because the 1991 Act did not amend the ADEA.92 That argument
does not effectively rebut the Smith-based argument. Finally, the majority rejected
principles of symmetry and simplicity by adopting a different analytical framework for
the ADEA, saying this is what is required by the Architect’s blueprint. It was not
required, and it was a poor choice, as the dissenting justices explained.
II. A BLUEPRINT REQUIRING A LESS PROMINENT ADEA
Divergence between Title VII law and ADEA law is not limited to the holding in
Gross regarding proof structures. For many years, the Court has said that there are
differences between the phenomenon of employment discrimination based on race or sex
and discrimination because of age, and the Court has suggested or held (depending on the
case) that the law under Title VII and the law under the ADEA should differ in ways
reflective of those differences. Gross is the latest of those decisions. This approach to
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interpreting the ADEA was introduced in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins93 and further
developed in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,94 Smith v. City of Jackson,95
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,96 and Kentucky Retirement System v.
EEOC.97 The divergence should raise a concern beyond the increasing asymmetry in
employment discrimination law. The divergence invariably has produced less protection
against age discrimination than is available for the characteristics covered by Title VII.98
Is that structure, with a relatively less protective age discrimination law, consistent with
the Congressional blueprint? With a large and growing percentage of the workforce in
the United States in the protected class under the ADEA, and in the higher ranges of that
protected class, this is an important question to consider. Gross is the most significant
case reducing ADEA protection by making it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover in the
most common type of case—disparate treatment. It has provoked negative reactions
from influential people and organizations and calls for Congressional action.99
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A. Laying the Foundation for Divergent Law Under Title VII and the ADEA
One of the most obvious differences between age discrimination and
discrimination based on the characteristics covered by Title VII is that Congress passed
separate laws.100 The Court began exploring the implications of this fact in Hazen Paper
Co. The plaintiff was fired a short time before his pension vested, and he sued, alleging
age discrimination.101 He won a jury verdict. The Court planted the idea that the
disparate impact theory of discrimination, which was developed under Title VII, may not
apply to the ADEA.102 After explaining the two theories of discrimination, the Court
stated that disparate treatment addresses “the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit
in the ADEA.”103 The Court explained why age discrimination law might differ from
Title VII law: the phenomenon of age discrimination in the workplace usually involves
negative stereotyping about older workers being less productive rather than animus- or
hatred-based discrimination.104 The main adverse employment action that Congress
sought to address in the ADEA was that older workers were being fired based on
“inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes.”105 The Court was concerned that the jury may
have based its finding of age discrimination on a finding that the employer fired plaintiff
because of his pension status, and it remanded for reconsideration of whether the
termination was based on age.
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Hazen Paper Co. did not ultimately pronounce ADEA law that differed from Title
VII law, but it set the stage for such law. In the aftermath of Hazen Paper Co., many
lower courts seized upon the Court’s statement that disparate treatment is primarily what
Congress sought to address in the ADEA as the basis for holding that disparate impact is
not applicable to the ADEA.106
B. Different Law on Reverse Discrimination
The Court encountered the issue of whether the ADEA covers reverse
discrimination107 in General Dynamics Land Systems.108 The case involved the
elimination of health care benefits for future retirees except those who were 50 or older
on a certain date. The plaintiffs were employees between ages 40 and 50. The majority
in a 6-3 decision held that Congress did not intend for the age discrimination act to cover
reverse discrimination claims. Recognizing that reverse discrimination claims are
covered by Title VII, the majority began with the fact that age was covered in a separate
and subsequently enacted law. Reviewing legislative history of the ADEA, the Court
concluded that all references except one indicate that the ADEA was intended to protect
older workers from discrimination against them and in favor of younger workers.109
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The majority then argued that age as used in the ADEA’s “because of . . . age”
prohibition is properly understood as meaning “old age.” The Court explained that while
“race” and “sex” as used in Title VII are best interpreted as referring to all races and both
sexes, age as used in the ADEA is best interpreted narrowly, referring only to older
age.110 The Court also referred to the “social history” of age discrimination, which,
considered in conjunction with the statutory reference, leads to an interpretation of the
phrase meaning discrimination against older people.111
A dissenting opinion authored by Justice Thomas argued first that the plain
language of the ADEA did not say discrimination against older people, but just “because
of . . . age.”112 The dissent also relied for additional support on the EEOC’s interpretation
of the ADEA.113 The dissent also pointed out that Title VII has been interpreted as
covering reverse discrimination notwithstanding that there was no indication in the
legislative history that discrimination against whites was a problem sought to be
addressed by the law.114 Comparing the majority’s interpretation of the ADEA with the
established interpretation of Title VII, the dissent said, “In light of the Court’s opinion
today, it appears that this Court has been treading down the wrong path with respect to
Title VII since at least 1976.”115
General Dynamics Land Systems interprets the ADEA as narrower than Title VII,
and it renders the law asymmetrical. The result was not obvious, as indicated by a well-
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reasoned dissent.116 The majority rejected the dissent’s argument that “age” should be
interpreted as the Court has interpreted “race” and “sex” in Title VII. The majority said
that in common usage, one must add a modifier to “race” or “sex” to narrow the meaning,
but in common usage “age” without a modifier means old age.117 The majority opinion
looks at almost identical language in Title VII and the ADEA and distinguishes them,
thus building asymmetrically. Similarly, in the later Gross case, the dissent would argue
that the majority looks at virtually identical language in Title VII and the ADEA and yet
develops divergent law.118
What may have troubled the majority about recognizing reverse discrimination
under the ADEA is the fact that employers must allocate resources for both employment
and retirement benefits on some basis, and years of service and/or age is often the basis
selected for making allocation decisions, particularly when employers must bargain with
unions. This same concern can be seen in all of the other cases discussed in this section.
To permit claims when employers make such distinctions based in part on age either
would subject employers to substantial liability under the ADEA or would deprive them
of what the Court thinks is a relevant and reasonable basis for making such decisions.
C. Symmetry and Asymmetry in Disparate Impact and a Pyrrhic Expansion of the ADEA
The Court decided in Smith v. City of Jackson 119 that the disparate impact theory
of discrimination is applicable to ADEA claims. The police department in Jackson,
Mississippi had given raises constituting a higher percentage to officers with five or
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fewer years of seniority. The reason given by the department for the disparity was to
raise the salaries of junior officers so that they were competitive in the marketplace.
Because most of the officers who had less than five years of experience were under 40,
the plaintiff sued, alleging that the compensation plan had a disparate impact on officers
in the protected class. Seizing upon dicta in Hazen Paper Co. that disparate treatment is
the principal discrimination targeted by the ADEA, many lower courts had held that the
disparate impact theory was not available under the ADEA.120 The Court unanimously
rejected that proposition, relying upon the principle that when Congress uses the same
language in similar statues, the Court will presume that Congress intended them to have
the same meaning.121
So, the case appears to be an exception to both of my arguments about recent
Supreme Court interpretations of the ADEA vis-à-vis Title VII: that the Court is not
building symmetrically and that it is interpreting the ADEA more narrowly. To an extent
that is true; however, the Court went on to describe a disparate impact structure that is
different from that in Title VII, and one under which it should be far more difficult for
plaintiffs to recover. The Court said that two statutory differences between the ADEA
and Title VII require this narrower version of disparate impact. First, the Court explained
that the ADEA’s “reasonable factors other than age” (RFOA) provision,122 which has no
analogue in Title VII, narrows ADEA coverage.123 Second, the Court pointed out that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the disparate impact proof structure articulated in
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Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio124 by inserting a codified version in Title VII, but the
Act did not similarly amend the ADEA.125 Thus, the Court concluded that the version of
disparate impact applicable to the ADEA is the old Wards Cove version.126 What this
meant was left vague, and would cause the Court to issue a clarification in Meacham.127
The Court applied the new ADEA disparate impact analysis to the facts and held that the
plaintiffs had not alleged any specific employment practice which could cause a disparate
impact.128 It is not at all clear what is required to constitute a specific employment
practice and why the Court thought that the plaintiffs had failed to identify one.129 The
Court provided an alternative reason why plaintiffs lost in Smith, explaining that the
reason for the difference in raises, bringing salaries in line with competition to retain
police officers, satisfied the “reasonable factors other than age” (RFOA) provision.130
Thus, although the Court recognized disparate impact under the ADEA, it created an
analysis that would made it very difficult for plaintiffs to recover, and it resulted in a
plaintiffs’ loss as applied to the case.131
Smith is an oxymoronic opinion: it expands the ADEA but only superficially, and
it creates symmetry between the ADEA and Title VII, but not really.132 The Court
grounds its holding on the principle that when the same language is used in Title VII and
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the ADEA, it should be interpreted as having the same meaning. Then the Court goes on
to recognize differences in language between the ADEA and Title VII, and it bases the
different version of disparate impact on those differences. As in Gross, the fact that
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII and did not similarly amend
the ADEA was crucial to a different interpretation of the ADEA. In the final analysis,
although one may criticize some aspects of Smith, such as the cryptic discussion of a
requirement that plaintiffs prove a specific employment practice, the decision seems well
reasoned. It attempts to preserve symmetry between the two employment discrimination
statutes to the extent the statutory language permits. In contrast, Gross eschews
symmetry more than the differences in statutory language require.
D. More Symmetry and Asymmetry in Disparate Impact and More Restrictive Expansion
of the ADEA
In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory133 the Court decided that the
RFOA provision in the ADEA is an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the
burden of persuasion. The Court’s consideration of the issue can be traced to the
confusing reference in Smith v. City of Jackson to the ADEA disparate impact theory
being the Wards Cove version. The Second Circuit understandably thought the Wards
Cove reference meant the burden-of-persuasion scheme of Wards Cove applied, in which
the Court had placed the burden of persuasion on business necessity and job relatedness
on the plaintiff.134 The Supreme Court explained that the Second Circuit had

133
134

128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).
Meacham, 461 F.3d 134, 140-41 & 144 (2d Cir. 2006), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).

35

misinterpreted its reference to Wards Cove.135 Looking to the section in the age act that
contains RFOA, the Court pointed out that its neighbor in that section is bon fide
occupational qualification, which is interpreted as an affirmative defense to disparate
treatment claims.136 After declaring RFOA to be an affirmative defense, which would
seem to be a favorable result for those seeking ADEA protection, the Court seemed to
apologize for the interpretation:
That said, there is no denying that putting employers to
the work of persuading fact finders that their choices are reasonable makes
it harder and costlier to defend than if employers merely bore the burden
of production; nor do we doubt that this will sometimes affect the way
employers do business with their employees. But at the end of the day,
amici's concerns have to be directed at Congress, which set the balance
where it is, by both creating the RFOA exemption and writing it in the
orthodox format of an affirmative defense. We have to read it the way
Congress wrote it.137
The Court also tried to assuage concerns over these potentially harsh results by
explaining that “[i]dentifying a specific practice is not a trivial burden [on plaintiffs].”138
Meacham is much like Smith in its oxymoronic approach to the ADEA. It
relieves plaintiff of the burden of disproving RFOA. As the Court notes, however, this
was not new law, as it previously had referred to RFOA as an affirmative defense.139 The
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Court’s reaffirmation of that proposition in Meacham became necessary only because of
its ambiguous reference in Smith to Wards Cove. The salient feature of the case is the
Court’s effort to assure amici that plaintiffs will have a very hard time winning disparate
impact claims under the ADEA. The Court suggested that not only would plaintiffs have
difficulty identifying a specific employment practice, employers should easily prevail on
the RFOA defense unless the nonage factor is “obscure for some reason.”140 In such a
case, the employer would have a harder time satisfying the burden of persuasion on the
affirmative defense.141
E. Narrowing the ADEA and More Asymmetry—The Troublesome Issue of Pension
Benefits
The Court considered whether a retirement plan that made distinctions based on
age violated the ADEA in Kentucky Retirement Systems, Inc. v. EEOC.142 The state’s
retirement system provided two routes by which one could reach normal retirement and
receive full retirement benefits: 1) 20 years of service regardless of age; or 2) 5 years of
service and age 55 or older. The plan had a special provision for state employees in jobs
classified as hazardous. If such an employee became disabled and had not reached the
age or years of service necessary for normal retirement, the system added the minimum
number of imputed years necessary to bring the employee to normal retirement. The
number of imputed years that could be added was capped by the number of years the
employee had worked. The plaintiff in the case became eligible for normal retirement at
age 55, continued to work, and became disabled and retired at age 61. Because the
plaintiff had attained normal retirement at age 55, no imputed years were added for him.
140
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Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC sued, arguing that the plan facially
discriminated on the basis of age because it failed to impute years to the plaintiff because
he had attained age 55. The district court held that the plan did not violate the ADEA and
granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. It seemed obvious that the plan did, on its face, discriminate based on age, but
the Supreme Court majority’s contrary result, in a 5-4 decision, and the reason were clear
from the beginning of the opinion. The Court stated that it granted certiorari “[i]n light of
the potentially serious impact of the Circuit’s decision upon pension benefits provided
under plans in effect in many States.”143 The majority held that the plan did not violate
the ADEA, relying primarily on Hazen Paper Co. The majority quoted that case for the
proposition that for a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA the plaintiff must prove
that age “actually motivated” the decision.144 The Court specified six circumstances that
persuaded it that the differential treatment was not actually motivated by age: 1) age and
pension status are analytically distinct concepts; 2) this was not an individual
employment decision, but a set of complex rules, and the ADEA in several provisions
expressly treats pension benefits “more flexibly and leniently”;145 3) there was a nonage
rationale for the different treatment; 4) although the plan worked to the disadvantage of
the older worker in this case, it could work to the advantage of older workers over
younger workers in some fact situations; 5) the retirement system was not based on the
kind of stereotypical assumptions against which the ADEA was aimed; and 6) it is hard
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to think of another way to achieve the plan’s objective without cutting benefits to
disabled workers, which the state said it would do if it lost the case.146
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, agreed that the special
imputed years provision of the plan sought to achieve a laudable purpose but found the
majority’s opinion to bend the law to permit it.147 The dissent argued that the law
required a finding of facial age discrimination, leaving any changes to Congress. The
dissent faulted the majority for a misinterpretation of Hazen Paper Co., explaining when
there is facial discrimination, there is no requirement that plaintiff prove that age actually
motivated the decision: “The rule [in Hazen Paper Co.] is that once the plaintiff
establishes that a policy discriminates on its face, no additional proof of a less-thanbenign motive for the challenged employment action is required.”148 The dissent cited
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,149 an ADEA case, and Los Angeles Dept. of Water
and Power v. Manhart,150 a Title VII case, as examples that facially discriminatory
policies are illegal without proof of motive.151 In the six policy arguments set forth by
the majority, the dissent found no “clear rule of law.”152 The dissent argued that by
adopting a position rejected by all the appellate courts to have considered the issue the
majority “creates unevenness in administration, unpredictability in litigation, and
uncertainty as to employee rights once thought well settled.”153
The Court in Kentucky Retirement System again encountered the difficult issue of
pension plans and the ADEA. It is not surprising that the majority relied on another
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pension case, Hazen Paper Co., to try to explain why the facially discriminatory
provision of the plan did not violate the ADEA. Although one may concede that the
challenged provision had a beneficent objective, it did discriminate based on age. The
decision narrows coverage under the ADEA, permitting a facially discriminatory rule,
apparently because of its laudable objective. This is precisely what the Court has rejected
under Title VII in cases such as Manhart154 and UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,155 both
cited by the dissent.
III. REVISING THE BLUEPRINT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. is a stark
reminder of a message that should have been clear for quite a while: the Architect must
draw up a revised blueprint. A year ago, I wrote that it was time for Congress to pass
legislation to revise and clarify the proof structures used to analyze both disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases.156 I proposed new legislation because the
application of proof structures under disparate treatment and disparate impact has been
uncertain for years. Disparate treatment has been chaotic since the Court decided Desert
Palace in 2003. Disparate impact was not adequately clear when the Civil Rights Act of
1991 amended Title VII, the 1991 Act did not adequately clarify it, and problems were
multiplied by the recognition of a different disparate impact analysis under the ADEA in
Smith v. City of Jackson. With the Gross decision, Title VII and ADEA law has
diverged in a practically significant way as disparate treatment is the theory under which
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most litigation occurs.157 Thus, the need for legislation has become urgent in the wake of
Gross.
In my last proposal, I recommended that Congress should “legislate like it’s
1991,” meaning that Congress should consider issues and problems regarding the proof
structures raised by particular Supreme Court decisions and fix them. However, the
Court’s decision in Gross, following its decision in Desert Palace, leads me to
recommend that Congress legislate somewhat differently than it did in 1991. The 1991
revision left the blueprint unclear. Gross is the third major decision (Desert Palace and
Smith v. City of Jackson being the other two) in which the Court looked to what Congress
did and did not do in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and interpreted it in a way that has
made employment law more complex, less certain, and less symmetrical. The Court may
have interpreted what Congress intended in the 1991 Act correctly, but that is a dubious
proposition. Even if the Court was correct, the Court’s continued refusal to provide
specific details that the subordinate builders need158 demonstrates that the Architect needs
to provide substantial detail in the revised blueprint, leaving little to the interpretation of
the Master Builder. The Court’s grudging interpretation of the ADEA in Gross and other
cases reinforces the need for Congress to leave little to interpretation.
A. A Uniform Statutory Proof Structure for Disparate Treatment
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First, Congress needs to draw up the proof structure for disparate treatment. In
my previous proposal, I urged that Congress codify one proof structure for intentional
discrimination claims under all employment discrimination laws and that it should be a
variation on the statutory mixed-motives proof structure added to Title VII by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.159 I recommended revision of the second part, the same-decision
defense, so that if a defendant satisfied it, it would not bar all monetary recovery by the
plaintiff.160 I recommended that the employer’s establishing the same-decision defense
should either preclude monetary relief except backpay or it should preclude punitive
damages. The modification of the same-decision part was important because if one proof
structure is going to apply to all disparate treatment cases, rather than to the small subset
of cases to which mixed motives applied before Desert Palace, then plaintiffs should not
be barred from recovering money after they prove motivating factor. While I think that
such an adjustment of the statutory same-decision defense would be an improvement over
current law, Gross prompts me to urge Congress to carefully examine and debate the
issue of cause in fact under the employment discrimination laws.161
In light of Gross, Congress should consider the question of what level of
causation it wants in the statutes, and it should consider repealing the “because of . . .”
language, or at least expressly state that “because of” means “motivating factor” or
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whatever other causation standard Congress selects.162 In Gross, the majority and dissent
debated whether the statutory language requires but-for causation.163 As the dissent
points out, this is a debate that also took place twenty years earlier in Price
Waterhouse.164 What neither the majority nor the dissent in Gross points out is that the
full mixed-motives analysis is still a but-for test; mixed-motives analysis simply
bifurcates causation into two parts (motivating factor and same decision) and shifts the
burden of persuasion to the defendant on the second part. Justice Kennedy explained this
in his dissenting opinion in Price Waterhouse.165 Now that the standard of causation
debate has been reopened in Gross, Congress should consider the issue anew. The
dissent in Gross explained how difficult it is for a plaintiff to prove but-for causation on
the question whether the mental state of agents of an employer caused them to take
employment actions; the dissent contrasted this with what the dissent considered the
relatively easier task of torts plaintiffs proving but-for causation in the context of
physical, objective facts.166 The dissent also approved of the shifting burden at part two
of the same-decision analysis because the defendant employer is likely to have better
162

Congress should not leave open the interpretation that one can plead and prove a discrimination claim
under either the “because of” provision or the new causation provision. Regarding this problem under
current law, see infra note 168.
163
Compare Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350-2351 with id at 2354-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164
Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 283:
One of the principal reasons the plurality decision may sow confusion is that it claims
Title VII liability is unrelated to but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-for standard once it
has placed the burden of proof as to causation upon the employer. This approach
conflates the question whether causation must be shown with the question of how it is to
be shown. Because the plurality's theory of Title VII causation is ultimately consistent
with a but-for standard, it might be said that my disagreement with the plurality's
comments on but-for cause is simply academic.
See also Katz, supra note 24, at 658 (“The 1991 Act framework imposes liability at the
`motivating factor’ level, requiring `but for’ causation only for damages.”); Zimmer, supra
note 35, at 1930-31.
166

Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358 (Stevens, J. dissenting).

43

access to information regarding whether it would have taken the same employment action
in the absence of discrimination.167 Now that the Court in Gross has come full circle and
reengaged in the debate over the appropriate standard of causation in employment
discrimination cases, twenty years after Price Waterhouse launched the debate, Congress
should not just patch over this issue, as it did in 1991.168 Instead, it actually should
debate the issue and decide the standard of causation and ultimately specify it in the
statute so that the Court does not spend another twenty years trying to resolve it. The
appropriate standard of causation is significant because it is translated into the proof
structures used. For example, what standard of causation does the McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis incorporate? It usually is said be but-for causation, but I contend that it
actually is sole causation.169 The mixed-motives analysis initially employs a motivating
factor standard of causation and then but-for causation when it shifts the burden to the
employer on the same-decision defense. I doubt Congress is going to dispatch with some
notion of but-for causation, having embraced it in the two-part mixed-motives analysis in
the 1991 Act (essentially affirming the Court’s cause-in-fact debate in Price
Waterhouse). If the standard Congress chooses is but-for causation, the mixed-motives
analysis incorporates that standard well. Given the Court’s interpretation of “because of”
in Gross and the potential for courts to interpret the statute as countenancing separate
167
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“because of” and “motivating factor” claims, Congress should repeal the “because of”
language. Alternatively, if Congress keeps “because of” out of respect for history, it
should render it decorative only by expressly providing that “because of” means the
selected causation standard.
In light of Gross, Congress should broaden the causation debate beyond causation
standards that already have been used in employment discrimination law. The causation
standards were borrowed from tort law. An innovation in tort law that would further
ameliorate the difficulty and uncertainty of plaintiffs proving cause in fact regarding the
employer’s mental state is permitting fact finders to discount recoveries based on the
percentage chance that discrimination occurred. This is a version of the lost-chance-ofsurvival analysis that has made modest gains since being introduced in medical
malpractice wrongful death cases in tort law.170 The flipside of lost chance is increased
risk, which has been used in some toxic torts and fear-of-contracting-disease cases.171
Incorporating such an approach into the current statutory mixed-motives analysis, for
example, the plaintiff could prove that race was a motivating factor in an employment
action, and the burden would shift to the employer to prove the same-decision defense.
The fact finder could decide on a percentage basis to what extent the employer persuaded
on its defense, if at all, and reduce the recovery by that percentage. I would apply the
percentage reduction to all monetary relief—compensatory and punitive damages and
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backpay.172 One of the chief arguments in favor of lost chance in medical malpractice
cases is that it avoids the all-or-nothing approach of other causation analyses.173
Moreover, a lost chance/increased risk approach would ameliorate the misfit between
employment discrimination law and causation standards measuring the causative role of
mental states.174 Essentially, lost chance/increased risk model asks the fact finder to
decide how likely it is that discrimination occurred, and it adjusts the damages awarded
to that probability. Although lost chance has been applied almost exclusively in medical
malpractice cases, it has been applied in some employment discrimination cases.175
In the end, I think Congress will decide on a more well-established standard of
causation, opting for the two-stage motivating factor and same-decision defense with
some remedy-reducing effect. It is important, however, for the remedy-limiting effect of
the same-decision defense to be reduced.
I reassert my argument that the same proof structure be made applicable to Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. This would change the holding of Gross. The Court
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majority explained that it must require but-for causation, with no shifting burden, based
on the “because of . . . age” language of the ADEA. The Court was clear that the mixedmotives analysis does not apply under the ADEA. How about the McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis? The Court did not say; in fact it said that it had never answered that
question: “[T]he Court has not definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework
of McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green . . . , utilized in Title VII cases is appropriate in the
ADEA context.”176 After Gross, it seems likely that none of the established proof
structures apply to the ADEA. Unless Congress chooses to dispense with all proof
structures, the same one should apply to disparate treatment claims under all the laws.
The only reason to apply different proof frameworks is to make it relatively harder or
easier for plaintiffs to recover under the laws. The Court in Gross interpreted the
blueprint as making it harder for age discrimination plaintiffs to recover than plaintiffs
asserting claims under Title VII. I do not think that Congress will make that choice,
particularly in the context of intentional discrimination. Indeed, the Court in Hazen
Paper Co. suggested that age discrimination might not encompass disparate impact, but it
said that “[d]isparate treatment . . . captures the essence of what Congress sought to
prohibit in the ADEA.”177 For intentional discrimination, a uniform proof structure
should apply. This is simple,178 symmetrical, and a good policy decision.
B. A Uniform Statutory Proof Structure for Disparate Impact
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In my earlier proposal, I recommended that Congress modify the statutory
disparate impact analysis in Title VII and make that analysis applicable to the ADEA as
well.179 Without rehashing too much detail, I recommended tweaking the prima facie
case, eliminating job related from the business necessity/job relatednesss defense, and
merging alternative employment practice into business necessity.180 Congress could
provide that this same analysis applies to the ADEA. If it does so, it should repeal the
reasonable factors other than age (RFOA) defense in the ADEA because the Court in
Smith v. City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory indicated that
RFOA is a harder defense to satisfy than business necessity. I argue for this uniform
proof structure less forcefully than I do for uniformity regarding disparate treatment.
When the Court explained the distinctions between age discrimination and race (and
perhaps sex) discrimination in Hazen Paper Co., the Court suggested that these
differences might manifest themselves in the nonapplicability of disparate impact to the
ADEA. I think there is a risk that several types of employment decisions, such as
reductions in force and pension and retirement plans, routinely impact workers who are
forty or older more than younger employees, and such decisions may subject employers
to liability under disparate impact. Accordingly, Congress should decide whether
disparate impact should apply to the ADEA. However, the current ADEA disparate
impact analysis established in Smith and Meacham should not be maintained. It is
ambiguous (e.g., What constitutes an employment practice under Smith?), and it seems
virtually impossible for a plaintiff to win, as the Court suggested in Meacham.181 This
sham theory of discrimination should not be maintained. Congress is likely to choose to
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make disparate impact applicable to the ADEA. If it does, I think the same analysis
should apply, in the interest of simplicity and symmetry.

C. The Less Protective ADEA
The issue of fixing the proof structures is the most important issue for Congress to
address. The proof structures are applied in litigation on a daily basis—from evaluating
the strength of a case, to conducting discovery, to ruling on dispositive motions. By
fixing the proof structures along the lines I have suggested, Congress would address the
most significant issues and make employment discrimination law simpler, more certain,
and more symmetrical. It also would overturn several of the Supreme Court decisions
that have narrowed the ADEA: Smith, Meacham, and Gross. Of the remaining cases,
Hazen Paper Co. does not need to be addressed because it laid the foundation for
different law under Title VII and the ADEA and suggested that disparate impact might
not apply to the ADEA. For the other two cases that narrowed the ADEA, it is not clear
to me that Congress should legislate regarding General Dynamics Land Systems or
Kentucky Retirement Systems.
Kentucky Retirement Systems dealt with an issue that has caused ongoing
problems under the ADEA—pensions and retirement. While I find the case troubling
because it holds that a facially discriminatory policy does not violate the ADEA, the
result in the case is probably good. I doubt Congress would choose to abrogate the
decision. Congress could codify the result in the case or create a statutory exemption for
rules in pension plans, but with the Court’s decision as controlling precedent for similar
cases, it does not seem advisable for Congress to try to craft a general exception. If the
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case were likely to insulate other facially discriminatory policies, Congress may need to
act, but there seems to be adequate limiting language in the majority’s opinion. Unless
Kentucky Retirement Systems is relied on by lower courts to further constrict ADEA
coverage, I do not think Congress should address it.182
Congress should consider the reverse age discrimination issue of General
Dynamics Land Systems, but I do not have a strong position on whether Congress should
overturn the result. Reverse discrimination in the context of race is a controversial topic
that elicits strong views.183 Imagine the reaction that would be generated if the Supreme
Court held that whites could not sue for race discrimination or men could not sue for sex
discrimination. There has been no strong reaction, however, to the Court’s decision that
the ADEA does not cover discrimination against younger people within the ADEA’s
protected class.184 Congress is unlikely to be lobbied much, if at all, to overturn the
decision. The strongest criticism of the Court’s decision has not been made on policy
grounds, but on grounds of interpreting the plain meaning of statutory language and
interpreting the ADEA consistently with Title VII.185 If Congress declared reverse age
discrimination actionable, I think there is a possibility that it would generate a substantial
number of claims and lawsuits. As General Dynamics Land Systems indicates,
employers, in allocating resources and addressing retirement issues, sometimes do offer
benefits to older workers that they do not offer to younger workers. Furthermore, with an
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older workforce and people staying in jobs longer, older workers may have more clout
than in the past. Although my first inclination is to argue for symmetry between Title VII
and the ADEA, this is an issue on which there is not a clear problem and little pressure
for a change now. Accordingly, I think Congress should not address General Dynamics
Land Systems at this time.
Although the Court’s narrowing of the ADEA from Hazen Paper Co. to Gross
needs to be addressed by Congress, it is the more stringent ADEA proof structures
created in Smith, Meacham, and Gross that are the heart of the problem.
CONCLUSION
The great tower of employment discrimination law is a project in need of a new
blueprint. The Master Builder has been interpreting the Architect’s 1991 drawing in
ways that have confounded the subordinate builders. The result is that employment
discrimination law has become more complex, less certain, and asymmetrical. It is hard
to believe that this is the tower envisioned by the Architect. Unless Congress steps in to
change and clarify the law, the builders are likely to continue babbling in different
tongues as they try to build on structures such as Desert Palace, Gross, and Smith. That
is no way to continue work on an already impressive tower that the Architect planned to
reach the heavens.

51

